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the Moral origins of God: darwin, 
durkheim, and the Homo Duplex 
theory of theogenesis
Douglas A. Marshall*
Department of Sociology, Anthropology, and Social Work, University of South Alabama, Mobile, AL, USA
A socio-evolutionary theory of the origin of “God” is presented. Its starting point is behav-
ioral duplexity, the fact that human beings are subject to two parallel modes of behavioral 
control: an older non-conscious system and a newer conscious one. The theory posits 
that the fabrication of, and subsequent belief in, supernatural entities (“Gods”) is a pre-
dictable byproduct of the interaction of these two systems. Specifically, because human 
beings’ profoundly social and moral faculties are primarily non-conscious, individuals 
experience their functioning as an external and coercive moral force. Faced with the 
conscious mode’s need to maintain the integrity of its nomos by accounting for such 
experiences, individuals collectively confabulate corresponding external, coercive, and 
moral entities, to which they misattribute this force. In doing so, they effectively create, 
and re-create, their “God(s).”
Keywords: theogenesis, evolutionary sociology, sociological theory, religion, social psychology, morality, 
evolutionary psychology
Men did not begin by imagining gods … The theory only came later, in order to explain and 
make intelligible to these … minds the modes of behavior which had thus been formed.
Emile Durkheim in Giddens (1972), p. 219
Religion is a universally and uniquely human phenomenon in that all human societies possess 
recognizably religious beliefs and practices, but (as far as we can tell) only human societies do so. 
Together, these observations suggest that religion is closely related to human nature, and perhaps 
explicable as a function thereof. At the same time, the indubitably social enactment and implications 
of religion, as well as the socially determined nature of its contents, ensure that any meaningful 
attempt to explain religion must simultaneously be a sociological exercise. Accordingly, as the 
evocation of human nature to explain religion has become increasingly frequent and explicit in 
recent years [e.g., Boyer (2001), Atran (2002), Wilson (2002a), Bering and Johnson (2005), Dawkins 
(2006), Sosis (2006), Bulbulia et  al. (2008), Wade (2009), Wright (2009), and Rossano (2010)], 
sociological concepts and mechanisms have played key roles in many such accounts.
Despite their many and diverse merits, such models invariably manifest a major sociological 
shortcoming, an omission which renders each’s explanatory potential partial at best. This is their 
failure to take seriously Durkheim’s seminal insights that the defining essence of religion lies in the 
subjectively and objectively real coercive force that it exerts on its followers, and that this force is of 
ultimately social origin (Durkheim, 1995[1912]).
The present paper proposes to fill this theoretical void by taking the origin of that force and its 
metamorphosis into “God” as its primary explanandum. By situating Durkheim’s insights within a 
Darwinian context and fleshing them out with concepts and mechanisms borrowed from cognitive 
and social psychology, it aims to provide a sociological account of theogenesis that is empirically 
FiGUre 1 | structure of the model.
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sound and of wide explanatory scope. Because the presentation 
and substantiation of this theory entails elaboration at several 
levels, Figure 1 provides a somewhat literal model of the theory’s 
“structure” as an aid to its comprehension.
eVoLUtionary GroUnds 
and BioLoGiCaL FootinGs
Extant evolutionary theories of religion are too numerous and 
nuanced for even cursory review in the space available here, 
but such accounts roughly divide into two major camps. The 
adaptationists posit that religion confers such significant adaptive 
advantages that human beings have evolved a natural disposition 
to believe in supernatural entities and to engage in religious 
behavior, while the spandrelists hold that religion is too esoteric 
to have itself been subject to biogenetic selection pressures, 
explaining it instead as an unintended side effect, or “spandrel,” 
of other traits that were selected for during evolution.
The present theory is decidedly spandrelist in positing that 
religion arose as a byproduct of the interaction of multiple 
adaptive features of human nature that originally evolved 
to serve other purposes.1 Specifically, it posits that “God” is 
a spandrel created by the interaction of three independently 
adaptive aspects  of  human nature, each of which is, in turn, 
a manifestation of one or the other of two core evolutionary 
virtues.2
Virtue 1: responsiveness 
to environmental Change
For all of its creative potency, biogenetic evolution has at least 
one major shortcoming: its glacial pace. Its modus operandi  – 
the iterated differential reproduction of genotypes – operates 
on time scales that inevitably extend across generations. 
1 Which is to say neither that religions are not functional nor that they do not 
evolve. They clearly are [e.g., Durkheim (1995) [1912] and Wilson (2002a)] and do 
[e.g., Wright (2009)]. But as for all spandrels, such exaptation or evolution occurs 
after their emergence and thus remains irrelevant to their origins.
2 “Virtue” is coined here to indicate a quality of such adaptive value that evolution 
consistently bends towards it. More abstract than any single trait, virtues can be 
achieved in multiple ways, with any trait that advances them tending to remain and 
proliferate within the populations that give rise to them.
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Accordingly, any trait that allows organisms to expedite their 
responsiveness to environmental events conveys a decisive 
advantage to any organism possessing it.3
The principal manifestation of this premium on speedy 
responsiveness is the ubiquity of genotypes that code for phe-
notypes that are themselves variable within, rather than across, 
individual organisms – an adaptation known, more prosaically, as 
“behavior” (Bonner, 1980; Wolpert, 2008). Despite the sweeping 
success of behavioral adaptation as a whole, continued selective 
pressure for fast and flexible responsiveness to the environment 
eventually gave rise to another, yet more rarified, innovation. 
Among humans (and to decreasing degrees, other primates, 
other mammals, and a smattering of other chordata), the sense 
organs that originally served to trigger behaviors in response to 
environmental events began also feeding information about the 
external environment to neural structures capable of construct-
ing an internal model thereof.
The resulting “schema” or “nomos” (Tolman, 1948; Berger 
and Luckmann, 1967) constitutes a revolutionary advance in 
organisms’ ability to respond to changes in their environment. 
By using the nomos to simulate their environment, organisms 
can anticipate changing conditions, assess competing behavioral 
responses, and react to novel events before they even occur. This 
internal mode of control – in a word, “cognition” – is the founda-
tion of human beings’ quantitatively unique capacities for reason, 
tool use, language, and culture. Indeed, culture itself can be fruit-
fully understood as a further refinement of a species’ capacity for 
timely and flexible responsiveness – a complementary mode of 
adaptation that coevolves with, and as an extension of, biology 
(Wilson, 1998; Boyd and Richerson, 2004).
For present purposes, the crucial point is this: when the 
newer system of internal control arose, it did not supersede its 
predecessor, but was erected atop it. Possessing both the newer, 
nomos-driven mode of behavioral control and the older, more 
automatic, mode, we are Homo Duplex.4
In various forms, this dualism has long suggested itself to 
astute observers of human nature. As Durkheim (1964) [1914], 
p. 337, concludes after surveying the long history of dualistic 
theories of human nature: “It is not without reason that man 
feels himself to be double: he actually is double. There are in 
him two classes of states of consciousness that differ from each 
3 Sadly, Darwin’s iconic “quote” about the virtue of responsiveness – “It is not 
the strongest of the species that survives, nor the most intelligent that survives. 
It is the one that is most adaptable to change” – turns out to be something he 
never actually wrote. While a compelling argument can be made that the line 
nevertheless accurately reflects his thoughts on the matter, the idea’s provenance 
is less important than its empirical validity. One timely indicator thereof concerns 
the extent to which the current success of invasive species stems from their abil-
ity to quickly adapt to climate change. As Wolkovich et al. (2013) demonstrate, 
invasive species have advanced their date of first blooming to exploit ever-earlier 
Springtimes much more effectively than, and at the expense of, their native 
competitors. She notes that, “It’s shocking to see how quickly the playing field is 
being shifted in favor of species that can be super-adaptable. The species that win 
are going to be those that can take advantage of new opportunities very quickly.” 
[in Nijhuis (2013)].
4 Thus, contra many critics of evolutionary sociology, human distinctiveness 
consists of having a conscious mode in addition to or alongside our non-conscious, 
not instead of it.
other in origin and nature, and in the ends toward which they 
aim.”5 Today, such dualism stands as a foundational principle 
and unifying thread of the last quarter century of cognitive and 
social psychology. Indeed, the “dual-process models” spawned 
by the recognition of this duality have become the norm in the 
study of almost every facet of mental functioning (Wegner and 
Bargh, 1998; Chaiken and Trope, 1999; Uleman, 2005; Bargh and 
Morsella, 2008; Kahneman, 2011), even finding their way into 
mainstream sociological theory [e.g., Marshall (2002, 2010) and 
Vaisey (2009)].
These modes can be contrasted along multiple dimensions, 
but to emphasize the distinction most relevant for our purposes, 
I will adopt the terminology of non-conscious mode/conscious 
mode. Evolving long before, and in the absence of, conscious-
ness, the non-conscious mode is invisible to consciousness, 
inimical to introspection, independent of conscious intention, 
and, due to its prelinguistic origins, effectively mute (Nisbett 
and Wilson, 1977; Wilson, 2002b; Bargh and Morsella, 2008). As 
per Vedantum (2010), it is The Hidden Brain, directing behavior 
via such “automatic” (Schneider and Schiffrin, 1977) means of 
control as reflex, affect, and intuition. Composed of multiple 
more-or-less autonomous modules,6 each of which evolved to 
surmount a particular problem, it is less a “thing” than a collec-
tion of behavioral adaptations, which are robust and strikingly 
effective and efficient at tasks ranging from simple homeostatic 
maintenance to complex feats of judgment, learning, and action 
of the kind usually associated with consciousness (Minsky, 1986; 
Reber, 1993; Wilson, 2002b; Carruthers, 2006; Vedantum, 2010; 
Kahneman, 2011).
By contrast, the Conscious Mode’s eponymous distinction 
is that it operates in and through consciousness – when acting 
under its influence, the actor is aware of the fact that they are 
acting, aware of the true causes of that action, and is able to 
intentionally start, stop, or otherwise alter the action, hence its 
original “controlled” moniker (Schneider and Schiffrin, 1977). 
Relative to the non-conscious mode, it is a generalized processor 
that can simulate and operate on pretty much any domain that 
it can represent to itself. As such, it is highly flexible, but more 
effortful and slower than its non-conscious partner (Wegner 
and Bargh, 1998; Kahneman, 2011). Because language is itself a 
manifestation of its essential representationalism, the conscious 
mode is by far the more loquacious one.
Although these two modes of behavioral control are ideally 
complementary in operation, they are not necessarily so. When 
they do clash, the contest is decidedly one-sided, as the non-
conscious system is primary to its counterpart in every sense 
of the term: it is evolutionarily and developmentally older. It is 
faster, more robust, and more closely coupled to judgment and 
behavior (Reber, 1993; LeDoux, 1996; Wegner and Bargh, 1998; 
5 Although his subsequent identification of these states as “individual” versus 
“social” is mistaken, his descriptions of the modes accord generally well with 
modern psychological accounts of them.
6 While the degree of modularity in the human mind is a matter of some debate, 
the present model does not turn on strong modularity assumptions but only on the 
undisputed relative speed and competence of the non-conscious faculties to which 
the term “module” is typically applied.
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Bargh and Chartrand, 1999; Wilson, 2002b; Gazzanaga, 2011).7 
Thus, though it has historically gotten top billing, the conscious 
mode is not only not a soloist but also the decidedly junior partner 
in the Homo Duplex duet.
Virtue 2: sociality
Despite its long ascendency in Western culture, the Hobbesian 
view of human nature and, indeed, all of nature, as essentially 
individualistic and selfish has of late become empirically unten-
able. Its successor is a radically social view in which individualism 
and selfishness are evolutionary liabilities, and the capacity to live 
among, and cooperate with, other conspecifics is of such adaptive 
value that sociality arguably amounts to the “third leg” of evolu-
tion (Nowak, 2011; Wilson, 2012).
Even against this background of pervasive sociality, human 
beings stand out as “hypersocial” “supercooperators” (Hrdy, 
2009; Bowles and Gintis, 2011; Lieberman, 2014; Warneken and 
Tomasello, 2006). Such rarified sociality is a cumulative achieve-
ment, an accretion of myriad social capacities and dispositions 
acquired throughout the evolutionary history of our species, 
almost all long before the advent of our conscious mode of 
behavioral control. Given their age and the adaptive primacy of 
the sociality that they make possible, it is little wonder that these 
continue to operate under the jurisdiction of the non-conscious 
mode (Turner and Maryanski, 2012; Lieberman, 2014).8 In sum, 
the evolutionary story of human sociality reiterates and substan-
tiates what Durkheim (1964 [1914], 1995 [1912]) intuited over 
a century ago: that social forces are simultaneously among the 
most profound influences on human behavior and among the 
most invisible to actor and observer alike.
psyCHoLoGiCaL FoUndations  
oF tHe ModeL
Three phenomena arising directly from these evolutionary 
grounds and biological footings form the psychological foun-
dations, upon which the Homo Duplex theory of theogenesis 
depends.
induction
Taken together, human dualism and the dominance of the 
non-conscious imply that an individual can experience affective 
states, obtain knowledge, and enact behaviors without conscious 
awareness as to how or why they have done so. For instance, 
without invoking artificially polarized distinctions between 
feeling and thinking, let us simply note that emotions are among 
the primary means by which the non-conscious mode influences 
7 Obvious examples include the near-impossibility of consciously suppressing 
reflexive behaviors such as the startle response, the phobic individual’s inability to 
consciously overcome their non-conscious fear response, and our faces’ proclivity 
for betraying our true feelings to others, often despite our best conscious efforts 
to conceal them.
8 Thus, despite his prescience on other matters, Durkheim (1964) [1914] effectively 
gets it backwards when he identifies the “social” almost exclusively with the con-
scious mode. In doing so, he rather profoundly (and ironically) underestimates the 
extent and primacy of human sociality.
action (Wegner and Bargh, 1998; Turner, 2000; Vedantum, 2010), 
and that these, in turn, are notorious for their subjectively opaque 
provenance, their defiance of conscious control, and their singu-
lar power to compel action.
“Implicit knowledge” (or more colloquially, “intuition”) is the 
second aspect of this ancient control mechanism. It occurs when 
individuals act on information extracted from their environment 
without knowing that they possess that information. The speciali-
zation and efficiency of the non-conscious means that individuals 
can and do accurately intuit facts about their environment without 
consciously detecting, or even seeking, that information (Bechara 
et al., 1997).
Whether via emotion, intuition, or other means of influ-
ence, the non-conscious clearly affects experience and behavior 
directly and independently of its conscious partner. Indeed, the 
entire history of experimental social psychology can justifiably be 
summarized as one long demonstration of individuals’ proclivity 
for being affected by factors beyond their conscious awareness 
(Wegner and Bargh, 1998). As Durkheim (1963) [1897], p. 62, 
rightly noted, “We are, of course, very far from always knowing 
the reasons that make us act …”.
Confabulation
Though it is the junior partner, the conscious mode is not insub-
stantial. Even from within its narrow jurisdiction [mostly novel 
situations in which non-conscious routines break down or are as 
yet non-existent (Langer, 1975; Wilson, 2002b)], consciousness 
has radically advanced our species’ ability to adapt. But such suc-
cess, and the very value of consciousness as an adaptive trait, is 
contingent upon the individual’s possession of, and confidence in, 
an intact nomos (Berger and Luckmann, 1967; Heine et al., 2006). 
When an individual becomes aware of inconsistencies between 
their nomos and the world it purports to represent, the model’s 
continued viability hangs on the individual’s ability to neutralize 
the threat posed by such anomalies.
Berger (1969) has constructed an influential and important 
theory of religion that emphasizes its role as a means of pre-
serving the nomos against such threats. However, research in 
the “cognitive consistency” tradition reveals that discrepancies 
among conflicting ideas and beliefs produce, at best, inconsist-
ent effects on individuals’ attitudes and behaviors (Cooper, 
2007). The crucial exception concerns cases in which the 
conflict is between one’s beliefs and one’s own behaviors, as 
documented by the half-century reign of Festinger’s theory of 
cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) as likely the most endur-
ing, important, and thoroughly substantiated theory in social 
psychology (Cooper, 2007). As per Festinger, the discomfort 
arising from an awareness that one’s behavior has diverged from 
(and is thus unexplained by) their consciously held expectations 
or intentions motivates individuals to reconcile the two, usually 
by altering their beliefs and attitudes to better align with their 
actions. The radical implication here is that not only do beliefs 
prompt action but actions can create beliefs. As Durkheim 
(1995) [1912], p. 372, again anticipates, “Since action cannot do 
without the intellect, the intellect is eventually pulled along the 
same way, adopting without argument the theoretical postulates 
the act requires.”
FiGUre 2 | the induction–confabulation process.
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In combination with humans’ previously discussed proclivity 
for induction, this post hoc needs to explain or justify behavior 
creates an interesting dynamic: when, due to the operation of their 
non-conscious mode, individuals feel, know, or act in ignorance 
of the true origins of these states and behaviors, their conscious 
mode demands that such events be accounted for. Lacking insight 
into their actual causes, the individual has little choice but to 
confabulate the entities or forces necessary to account for their 
experiences and actions. They do so by drawing upon context, 
previous experience, and a pool of culturally provided and 
socially endorsed legitimations to construct a plausible account 
of these states and behaviors (Nisbett and Wilson, 1977; Wilson 
and Brekke, 1994; Hirstein, 2006). Figure 2 provides a figurative 
illustration of the process by which actions, feelings, and cogni-
tions are induced by the nonconscious mode, and then perceived 
as anomalous by the conscious mode,  which then draws on and 
modifies culturally available constructs to confabulate explana-
tions and justifications so as to bridge the gap between what was 
expected and what was experienced and preserve the nomos.
Though it deals with a different dualism, one induced by surgi-
cal separation of the left and right brain hemispheres, Gazzanaga’s 
work with “split brain,” patients provides an instructive example 
of confabulation, in that after surgery, the right hemisphere 
of his patients’ brains could react appropriately to stimuli, but 
when asked to explain those reactions, the left hemisphere would 
confabulate patently incorrect justifications for them that were, 
however, consistent with whatever (different) stimuli it had been 
presented with. In the canonical example, a patient whose right 
hemisphere was shown a snow scene correctly pointed to a snow 
shovel, but when asked to explain that choice, his left hemisphere, 
which had seen a chicken claw rather than the snow scene, insisted 
that he had chosen the shovel for its usefulness in “cleaning out” 
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the chicken coop. The plethora of such findings has prompted 
Gazzanaga (2011) to hypothesize the existence of a dedicated 
“interpreter module” in the brain that constantly works to string 
episodic experience into a coherent whole by confabulating what-
ever constructs are necessary to do so. To once again acknowledge 
the Durkheimian antecedent: “One must be on guard against 
literally accepting the popular explanations that men devise to 
account for the customs they follow, when the real causes actually 
escape them. It is known how these … are constructed, it is not 
required that they be adequate or objective, but merely that they 
justify the practice” (Durkheim, 1963 [1897], p. 92).
Moral Faculties
Like the sociality of which it is a part, the idea of an innate 
human morality is enjoying a renaissance. Once viewed as an 
external and artificial restraint imposed upon an inherently 
immoral human nature, moral sentiments and actions are now 
understood to be every bit as real and natural as are the antisocial 
and selfish impulses that they counterbalance (Greene, 2002; 
DeWaal, 2006; Joyce, 2006; Lieberman, 2014; Warneken and 
Tomasello, 2006). As Haidt (2001), p. 826, explains, “Morality, 
like language, is a major evolutionary adaptation for an intensely 
social species, built into multiple regions of the brain and body.” 
Also like other aspects of sociality, human morality is a primar-
ily non-conscious faculty, with three of its four layers operating 
beyond the ken of consciousness (DeWaal, 2006).
The foundational layer of human morality is that of moral 
sentiments (DeWaal, 2006). Chief among these is empathy, our 
predilection for taking on the emotional states of those around 
us (DeWaal, 2006; Baron-Cohen, 2011; Lieberman, 2014). 
Empathetic mechanisms originated early in the evolution of 
mammals, probably as a means of inducing parents to provide 
the protracted and diligent care that mammalian offspring 
require (Haidt and Joseph, 2004). As such, they reside deep in 
the non-conscious (Hrdy, 2009; Turner and Maryansi, 2012).9 The 
other primary moral sentiment, reciprocity, insists that exchanges 
should be fair and that everyone should ultimately “get what they 
deserve.” Its compulsive power among primates, and humans in 
particular, is a remarkably robust and widespread finding across 
diverse research literatures (Becker, 1986; Mauss, 1990 [1922]; 
DeWaal, 2006; Bowles and Gintis, 2011).
The second, and equally non-conscious, layer of human 
morality is what DeWaal (2006) calls “community concern.” It 
encompasses a handful of behavioral dispositions united by their 
utility in helping individuals to live together in groups. They 
include peacemaking (DeWaal, 1990; DeWaal, 2006), anti-alpha 
bullying (Boehm, 2000), and the compulsion to conform to 
socially established rules (DeWaal, 2006; Kochanska et al., 2009).
9 Empathy’s non-conscious provenance is nicely illustrated by the following class 
demonstration: after introducing students to a plush baby seal toy named “Herbie,” 
I produce a large pair of scissors and pretend that I am about to cut him in half. My 
remonstrations that Herbie is only so much velour and acrylic fiberfill do nothing 
to alleviate the palpable moral distress that ensues. As is typical of states originating 
in the non-conscious, students are acutely aware of empathy’s subjective effects 
on their mental and emotional state, but unable to consciously override these 
responses, nor to explain why the fate of a patently inanimate object elicits such 
strong responses from them.
The third layer of human morality, moral judgment, also 
takes place almost entirely beyond the purview of consciousness 
(Haidt, 2001; Greene, 2002; DeWaal, 2006; Hauser, 2006; Joyce, 
2006). It entails the more-or-less uniquely human capacity to 
perceive, pass, and be subject to, “oughts,” the adaptive value 
of which lies in its ability to compel behavior over and against 
one’s immediate personal preferences, in that judging an act to 
be “right” or “wrong” can motivate action or abstention in ways 
that believing it to be rational simply cannot. Like language, the 
inborn capacity for moral judgment is developed through an 
interactive social process in which native dispositions are fleshed 
out with a socially transmitted set of culturally specific practices 
and grammars. Once acquired, both language and moral judg-
ment are thereafter deployed on an almost continuous basis 
with little or no conscious awareness of the underlying rules that 
govern it, though such rules demonstrably do exist (Haidt, 2001; 
Haidt and Joseph, 2004; DeWaal, 2006; Hauser, 2006).
The only clearly conscious layer of human morality – moral 
reasoning – is but a recent addition to a much older substrate of 
non-conscious moral sentiments, capacities, and predilections 
(Haidt, 2001; Turner and Maryanski, 2012). Although moral 
reasoning often plays an important role in reinforcing, calibrat-
ing, and extending the reach of moral behavior, its efforts, such 
as most conscious reasoning (Mercier and Sperber, 2011), focus 
more on legitimating non-consciously instigated actions than 
on actually directing action itself (Haidt, 2001; Greene, 2002; 
Hauser, 2006).
tHe HoMo dUpeX tHeory oF 
tHeoGenesis
Religions are in large part recognizable as religions based on 
their postulation of the supernatural beings and/or forces known 
colloquially as “gods.” Whatever the empirical status of any 
particular god, it can become and remain the kernel of a religion 
only once it attains, and for only so long as it retains, subjective 
reality to some discrete group of individuals. Accordingly, this 
paper takes theogenesis to be an essentially epistemic process by 
which certainty in the reality one or another “god” arises and is 
subsequently reproduced within the members of a group.
Though religious confidence has many buttresses, its ultimate 
source lies in the believer’s personal experience of the entity or 
force in question (James, 1994 [1911], Mueller, 2010 [1873], 
Durkheim, 1995 [1912]). As Otto (1950) [1917] famously argues, 
the first-hand experience of the “numinous” precedes and pre-
cipitates all other aspects and functions of religion. It follows that 
if one can (1) identify the source of these experiences and (2) 
account for why and how they would be consistently misattrib-
uted to fabricated supernatural beings, then one might thereby 
explain the origin of the gods themselves.
This paper contends that the experience of the numinous and 
its subsequent attribution to one or more gods are both explica-
ble as results of the interaction of the psychological foundations 
explicated above. In brief, it contends that the true referents of 
the experience of God are the states, knowledge, and behaviors 
induced by the moral faculties of the human non-conscious, 
and that the transformation of such experiences into “God” is a 
7Marshall Moral Origins of God
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spandrel of the conscious mode’s need to maintain its nomos by 
confabulating an entity to bridge the explanatory gap between 
such non-consciously mediated experiences and its extant 
nomos.
The attentive reader can likely anticipate the outlines of the 
argument to follow, but to paraphrase a commonplace, “the 
deity is in the details.” Since this has seldom been so literally 
true, let us more closely consider each of the hypothesized 
processes in turn.
the induction of religious experience
The first argument at hand is that it is the experience of states, 
knowledge, and behaviors originating in the non-conscious moral 
faculties that the construct of “God” is confabulated to explain. 
The context and the contents of religious experience each provide 
support for identifying the two.
the Context of religious experience
If the experience of god actually is that of the non-conscious, 
then its incidence should wax and wane with the non-conscious 
mode. An obvious example of such a pattern is the frequency with 
which the gods are encountered during sleep and dreams, when 
consciousness is quite literally dormant and the non-conscious 
ascendant. Beyond dreams’ celebrated centrality to “primitive” 
religions [e.g., Tylor (1920) [1871]], their significance as a site 
for interacting with the gods is institutionalized by the Romans’ 
construction of enkoimeteria – special sleeping rooms for the sick 
and injured where the gods were believed to visit their dreams 
to prescribe treatment (Henig, 1984). Among modern world 
religions, Judeo-Christian scripture and history is typical in the 
extent to which it is peppered with pivotal theophanies that take 
place during sleep, including Jacob’s revelation at Beth-el (Genesis 
28:12), Joseph’s charge to take Mary as his wife (Matthew 1:20), 
the Magis’ warning to avoid Herod (Matt. 2:12), and Constantine’s 
dream of victory at Milvian bridge.
Religion is, in fact, the lens through which dreams are most 
likely to be viewed. As Bulkeley (2008), p. 3, summarizes, “The 
historical and cross-cultural evidence is overwhelming on this 
point: Religion is the primary arena in which humans have tradi-
tionally expressed their dreams.” That dreams, which are of indu-
bitably non-conscious origin, are so akin to religious experiences 
as to be consistently interpreted as such, which suggests that the 
latter might well share the former’s non-conscious provenance.
It is perhaps even more telling to consider the techniques by 
which individuals and groups intentionally cultivate religious 
experiences. Religious ritual represents the most concentrated 
such effort, and most of its characteristic ingredients – sleep 
deprivation, consumption of ecstatic substances, rhythmic 
stimulation, spectacle, darkness, disguise, physical discomfort, 
co-presence, and the focusing of attention on a totemic object – 
overlap strikingly with established means of preoccupying, 
distracting, or befuddling the conscious mode (Durkheim, 1995 
[1912]; Marshall, 2002). Simultaneously deploying multiple such 
tools, religious ritual amounts to a powerful consciousness-
stifling technology.
Mystical practices more generally are likewise notable for their 
convergence with established means of curbing consciousness. 
In all of its various incarnations, meditation – the prototypical 
mystical exercise – is rather explicitly aimed at subjugating 
the conscious mind by focusing available attention on a single 
object, sound, or action so as to preclude conscious thought. 
Other common mystical practices are conspicuously effective at 
debilitating the conscious mode. Most dramatically, the whirl-
ing and jerking of Sufi dervishes, the mortification of Christian 
ascetics, and the contortions of Hindu fakirs all capitalize on the 
exceptional power of strong physical sensation to hijack atten-
tion and obliterate individuals’ capacity for sustained conscious 
thought (Scarry, 1987; Baumeister, 1991). More subtly, Kaballic 
enumeration and the Zen Koan are among techniques that seem 
designed to confound consciousness by boggling the mind with 
illogic or competing logics so as to create what James (1994) 
[1911], p. 336, calls “… that vertigo of self-contradiction which 
is so dear to mysticism.”
In sum, the contexts of religious experience suggests that, just 
as would be expected if the experience of God actually is that 
of the moral non-conscious, the gods are most likely to appear 
when and where the conscious mode is disadvantaged, and the 
non-conscious mode ascendent.
the Contents of religious experience
Although the specifics of the experience of god do vary across time 
and place, it is also true that, as Armstong (1993), p. 104, notes, 
“… when human beings contemplate the absolute they have very 
similar ideas and experiences”. Of these common elements, let 
us consider five in particular: ineffability, otherness, superiority, 
coerciveness, and moral righteousness. To be sure, this is neither 
the only possible list of such qualities nor does it apply equally well 
to every known religious tradition. It is, nevertheless, defensible 
in that each, as elaborated in turn, is distinctive, and applicable 
to multiple traditions.
Ineffability
One of the most universal and salient aspects of the experience 
of God is its resistance to verbal description and rational under-
standing – in short, its ineffability (Otto, 1950 [1917]; James, 
1994 [1911]; Mueller, 2010). According to the Kena Upanishad, 
Brahman is “… what cannot be spoken in words, but that whereby 
words are spoken … what cannot be thought with the mind, but 
whereby the mind can think” (Mascaró, 1965, p. 51). The Buddha 
is equally emphatic about the inadequacy of any description of 
Nirvana, while the Tao Te Ching cautions that, “The reason that 
can be reasoned is not the eternal reason. The name that can be 
named is not the eternal name” (Lao-Tze, 1898, p. 97). Among 
Jews and early Christians such ineffability finds expression in 
the intentionally unpronounceable tetragrammaton, YHWH, 
and, later, in the via negativa whereby God can be described 
only in double-negatives (e.g., “He is not non-existent”) since 
there are no words for what God actually is. As per one of James’ 
correspondents: “Human words cannot attain to expressing the 
inexpressible. Any description, however sublime it might be, 
could be but a profanation of the unspeakable truth” (James, 1994 
[1911], p. 248).
It is not simply that words are insufficient to describe the gods, 
but that they, and the concepts they represent, are incompatible 
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with the gods’ accurate comprehension. Just as Zen Buddhism 
and Taoism prescribe a “first-nen” or “uncarved” experience of 
the world – one unmediated by conceptual thought and labels – 
Christian mystic Gregory of Nyssa counsels that, “Every concept 
grasped by the mind becomes an obstacle in the quest to those 
who search” [in Armstrong (1993), p. 20].
Such ineffability is a predictable concomitant of non-
conscious-mediated experiences as hypothesized herein. It is 
not only that language is but a recent imposition upon a col-
lection of non-conscious faculties that evolved long before it 
did (Turner and Maryanski, 2012), but that the multiplex and 
parallel structure of the non-conscious renders it inimical to, and 
incompatible with, the unitary and serial structure that language, 
like conscious thought itself, requires. Accordingly, like the expe-
rience of God, the operation and contents of the non-conscious 
consistently defy verbal description and rational understanding 
(Wegner and Bargh, 1998; Bargh and Morsella, 2008; Vedantum, 
2010). Thus, if as postulated here, the non-conscious is the true 
referent of the gods, the observed ineffability, and antipathy to 
rational conceptualization is exactly what one would expect of 
them.
This perspective sheds new light on religions’ marked affinity 
for, and reliance upon, music and other forms of artistic expres-
sion (Armstrong, 1993). Otto (1950) [1917] holds up music as 
the very prototype of numinous experience, while James (1994) 
[1911], p. 458, contends that, “…  not conceptual speech, but 
music, rather, is the element through which we are best spoken 
to by mystical truth.” If, as postulated here, the experience of God 
arises from the non-conscious, it follows that, as non-consciously 
mediated experiences themselves (Haidt, 2001; Dijksterhuis and 
Meurs, 2006) esthetic appreciation and creation should excel as a 
means of conveying it, since they are akin to religious experience 
in ways that language and reason are not.
Otherness
The second key feature of the gods is their apparent externality 
to, and difference from, the believer. Though otherness may 
seem at first banal, it is integral both to Otto’s conception of the 
numinous (Otto, 1950 [1917]) and to Durkheim’s definition of 
religion (Durkheim, 1995 [1912]). Its salience to believers them-
selves is manifest in the Hebrew adoption of the term “Holy” 
(literally, “other”) as their God’s defining descriptor. Thus, the 
otherness of the gods is an apparently distinctive one.
For the present theory, which postulates an internal origin 
for such experiences, this otherness is distinctive precisely 
because it is illusory. Individuals ascribe internal versus external 
causation for their actions primarily on the basis of whether 
or not an event was present in their consciousness just before 
it happens (Wegner, 2002). Because non-conscious-induced 
actions and states are, by definition, not preceded by conscious 
intentions or imagery, they are easily misattributed to exog-
enous causes. But this creates a subjective paradox, in that even 
as the gods confront the believer as an external “other,” they are 
both inescapable and intimately familiar with the individual’s 
thoughts and actions. As David declares, “O  lord, you have 
searched me and known me! You know when I sit down and 
when I rise up; You discern my thoughts from afar …  Even 
before a word is on my tongue, behold O Lord, you know it 
altogether …  Where shall I go from your Spirit? Or where 
shall I flee from your presence?” (Psalms 139:1-2,4,7). Otto 
(1950) [1917] long ago identified this paradox, the incongruous 
simultaneity of intimacy and externality, as one of the elements 
which makes the experience of God so numinously distinctive, 
and like ineffability, it is completely consistent with its herein-
postulated origin in the moral non-conscious: if the gods are, 
indeed, a manifestation of the believer’s own non-conscious, 
then they should be intimately familiar with, and omnipresent 
to, the believer. From the perspective of the present theory, it 
is the juxtaposition of this uncanny intimacy and inescapability 
with the gods’ (only) apparent externality that creates the highly 
distinctive otherness characteristic of them.
Superiority
The otherness of the Gods is of a piece with another defining 
characteristic – their apparent superiority to the believer. Gods 
are gods partly on the basis of their possession of at least some 
superhuman abilities and knowledge, reaching an apogee in 
the omniscience and omnipotence typically ascribed to the 
Abrahamic God. As he tells Isaiah, “Yes, the heavens are as high 
above the earth as my ways are above your ways, as my thoughts 
are above your thoughts” (Isaiah 55: 8-9). Such superiority com-
monly manifests itself in at least two ways, both of which are 
suggestive of a non-conscious origin.
First, the gods’ superiority frequently comes to light via their 
ability to bestow previously unknown strengths and skills upon 
the believer, or to reveal previously unsuspected knowledge to 
them. Composed as it is of multiple highly specialized and well-
honed modules (Carruthers, 2006; Kahneman, 2011), the non-
conscious knows things, has abilities, and possesses strengths that 
the conscious mode is oblivious to. When such modules manifest 
themselves as insights or intuitions that reflect greater knowledge 
than the individual consciously possesses, or as skills or stamina 
of which they were heretofore unaware, these foresights, insights, 
and abilities seem to have originated from something not only 
external, but superior, to the individual.
The superiority of the gods manifests itself second via the atti-
tude of submission that they inevitably evoke in their followers. 
James (1994) [1911], p. 233, argues that “…  self-surrender has 
been and always must be regarded as the vital turning point of 
the religious life,” while Otto describes the essential emotion of 
religion as that of “… a creature, abased and overwhelmed by its 
own nothingness in contrast to that which is supreme above all 
creatures” (Otto, 1950 [1917], p. 10). Similarly, Berger (1969) has 
more recently emphasized the ubiquitous role of self-abnegation, 
or “masochism” in religious theodicies.
This attitude, too, is a predictable corollary of the hypoth-
esized role of the non-conscious. Self-consciousness is, after all, 
a variety of consciousness. To the extent that, as predicated here, 
religious experience follows from the latter’s eclipse by the non-
conscious mode, the dissolution of self is a logical concomitant, 
as demonstrated by both Baumeister’s work on “Escaping the 
Self (Baumeister, 1991) and Csikszentmihalyi’s work on “Flow” 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1975). In each, consciousness-disengaging 
activities (among which both include religious practices) deprive 
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the “me” of the attentional fuel that it requires to create the sense 
of self. To wit, Csikszentmihalyi (1975), p. 50, 43, notes that sub-
jects commonly report that while in flow “… you feel as though 
you almost don’t exist…,” and relates a rock-climber’s testimony 
that while climbing, he becomes “So involved he might lose 
consciousness of [his] own identity and melt into the rock.”
Thus, the ineffability, otherness, and superiority of the 
gods are each explicable via the known characteristics of non-
conscious-mediated experiences. But gods are not the only 
supernatural construct that could be invoked to account for 
such qualities. For instance, the non-conscious’ precociousness 
at detecting patterns in the environment fosters a prescience 
that could alternately be misattributed to ESP or alien com-
munication (Minsky, 1986). Likewise, the ineffable, apparently 
external, and superior creativity that it bestows can precipitate 
the confabulation of, or misattribution to, such supernatural 
quasi-deities as the muses.
Whether or not an experience is so ascribed hinges on two 
further, and uniquely “godly,” aspects of religious experience, 
both emerging from that specific subset of non-conscious ele-
ments that make up the moral faculties:
Coerciveness
As noted at the outset, the essential kernel that all religions 
share is their respective gods’ coercive power over believers 
(Durkheim, 1995 [1912]). Whether that god takes the form 
of an embodied deity or impersonal mana, it is their ability to 
figuratively and literally move the individual – even over and 
against that person’s intentions and desires – which constitutes 
the categorically religious aspect of religious experience. “Higher 
power” is the prevailing euphemism for “God” for good reason: 
across a spectrum extending from the fulfillment of arduous 
duties and loathsome commandments (e.g., Arjuna’s reluctant 
embrace of his Dharma of war, Abraham’s aborted sacrifice of 
Isaac), to assorted automatisms (e.g., glossolalia), to outright 
bodily possession (e.g., the Loa “mounting” the Voodun aco-
lyte), the gods are most definitively recognizable as such by their 
apparent power to make people do things. As per the Bhagavad 
Gita, “the lord of all creatures stands in the heart of all, making 
them move hither and thither like cogs in a machine by means 
of his uncanny power” (18.59–61). The crucial element here is 
not followers’ abstract belief that their God has such power, but 
rather their subjective experience of that power. As James (1994) 
[1911], p. 521, explains the persuasive impact of automatisms, 
“The subjects here actually feel themselves played upon by pow-
ers beyond their will. The evidence is dynamic, the God or Spirit 
moves the very organs of the body.”
By the present theory, the roots of such coercive power lie in 
the uniquely efficacious motors of action available to the moral 
faculties of the non-conscious. Indeed, as we have seen, the 
adaptive value of these faculties lies precisely in their ability to 
ensure that individuals do those things that members of a socially 
interdependent species must do to survive and thrive over the 
long haul, even, or especially, when other courses of action might 
be more immediately prudent, pleasant, or profitable.
Consider, for example, the compulsive power of reciprocity. 
The “magical” power of a gift to cause its recipient to reciprocate 
to its giver is at the root of Mauss’s fascination with the topic 
(Mauss, 1990). More broadly, we (along with some of our fellow 
primates) pay our debts, force others to pay theirs, and work 
hard to right perceived injustices despite the costs and dangers 
these actions can entail (Henrich et al., 2006). More darkly, we 
are driven to exact revenge on those who fail to reciprocate even 
when doing so is patently and dangerously irrational (Fehr and 
Gatcher, 2000; McCulloch, 2008).
The coercive power of the non-conscious moral faculties is 
hardly confined to reciprocity. Our predilection toward empa-
thetic attachment impels us to provide for and protect dependents 
despite the dire sacrifices sometimes required to do so. Likewise, 
our pro-normative inclinations lead us to abide by rules even 
when there is no one present to enforce them and to experience 
guilt for doing things we do not consciously consider wrong. 
Finally, our judgment of some actions as “bad” puts them firmly 
out of bounds, however tempting they might otherwise be, while 
our judgment of other actions as “good” makes their execution, 
however unprofitable or unpleasant, an imperative duty.
In each case, the moral faculties evince a singular ability 
to bind us to a course of action. Thus, though we are certainly 
not always good, we sometimes surprise ourselves by doing the 
“right” thing despite our conscious intentions or expectations to 
the contrary. This moral imprimatur of the force of god points us 
toward one last signal characteristic of the gods.
Moral Righteousness
Inseparable from the gods’ might to compel human behavior is 
their right to do so based on their identification with a trans-
cendent moral order (James, 1994 [1911]). At the monotheistic 
extreme, God is cast as an indelibly moral being whose actions 
and imperatives are categorically good. Where the gods are more 
numerous and/or less uniformly beneficent, deities embody-
ing the group’s core moral values still retain their place in the 
pantheon (e.g., Fides, Pietas). Even ostensibly a-theistic traditions 
such as Taoism, Upanishadic Hinduism, and Confucianism retain 
this transcendent moral imperative in the form of Tao, Dharma, 
and the Mandate of Heaven, respectively.
Just as the gods do not represent merely a brute force, but one 
legitimated by an antecedent moral principle, the non-conscious 
moral faculties routinely cloak their outputs in moral vestments. 
Because the adaptive value of passing moral judgments lies in 
their ability to compel action as an external imperative, not 
only must the true internal provenance of these judgments be 
shielded from consciousness, but their verdicts must be reified as 
a matter of course. We are compelled to avoid x not because we 
have decided it is wrong or because someone says it is wrong but 
because it is wrong in some at least subjectively objective sense 
(Joyce, 2006). As per Berger (1969), the nomos must present itself 
as cosmos. The resulting tendency to “gild” empirical objects with 
the moral qualities that our intuitions have assigned to them was 
long ago noted by Hume (1978) [1740] and has more recently 
been confirmed as an essential feature of human moral percep-
tion (Greene, 2002; Nichols and Folds-Bennett, 2003).
The gods further evince their ontological relationship with 
human morality in that their concerns map closely onto particu-
lar non-conscious moral faculties, as again exemplified by the 
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sentiment of reciprocity. The religious significance of reciprocity 
is reflected in such theological constructs as Karma, the “golden 
rule,” and scriptural admonitions that, “…  whatever one sows, 
that will he also reap” (Galatians 6:7). More indirectly, it also lies 
behind the evidently acute need to defend the ostensibly just (i.e., 
equitably reciprocal) nature of the gods from empirical experi-
ence to the contrary, as represented by “the problem of evil,” and 
the myriad theodicies advanced to defuse the threat to faith that 
such inequity represents (Berger, 1969).
Reciprocity’s imprint upon religion runs even deeper, 
however. Consider human beings’ seemingly reflexive drive to 
make sacrifices to their gods: whether in hopes of creating an 
obligation on the part of a god (as per the Roman tradition of 
explicitly contractual sacrifice) or in hopes of paying off whatever 
outstanding obligations the individual or group feels they owe 
to their god, the sacrificial impulse is born from and part of the 
fundamental human moral sentiment of reciprocity.
Probably, the strongest statement of the primacy of reciproc-
ity to the gods comes from Christianity, where even its putatively 
omniscient and omnipotent god can apparently find no less 
horrific means of balancing the moral books for humankind 
than through the torture-murder of his own, and only, son. It is 
even more significant that what was thereby attained was that 
god’s ability to elide the dictates of reciprocity on his followers’ 
behalf by “forgiving us our debts.” His ability and willingness 
to provide such an escape valve from the psychological burdens 
imposed by human beings’ possession of the moral sentiment 
of reciprocity is clearly a cornerstone of Christianity’s appeal to 
its followers.10
Thus, these five features together both constitute the core 
properties of the construct called “God” and are singularly con-
sistent with, and explicable as, manifestations of the operation 
of the moral non-conscious. Having thus established a degree 
of identity between the moral non-conscious and “God,” what 
remains is to flesh out the process by which the one comes to be 
mistaken for the other.
tHe ConFaBULation oF God
Though our non-conscious mode regularly induces anomalous 
and causally opaque states, knowledge, and behavior within or 
from us, most such instances are too trivial to attract our attention 
or to warrant explication. More salient and substantial instances 
of induction can usually still be resolved via fairly pedestrian 
acts of cognitive manipulation, but over the course of a lifetime, 
at least some few non-consciously induced events are of such 
conspicuous atypicality that their nihilation requires more heroic 
feats of confabulation. It is when such events involve the moral 
faculties that the potential for theogenesis arises, as accounting 
for such ineffable, external, superior, coercive, and immanently 
moral experiences logically necessitates the confabulation of 
a correspondingly ineffable, external, superior, coercive, and 
moral entity.
10 The Christian god is not the only one to evince such dispositions, as Shiva is 
likewise celebrated for his power to absolve the sins of his devoted followers, and 
Allah answers as well to Al-Rahim (the compassionate one).
The present theory contends that theogenesis occurs when 
individuals and groups bridge the gap between such experiences 
and their expectations by confabulating a cognitive construct 
that, like the lynchpiece of a jigsaw puzzle, fits and fills the 
space between the two, integrating the disparate aspects of their 
experience and conjoining these with their extant nomos. This 
confabulated construct is, in effect, their “God.”
“Theogenesis” actually subsumes two related, but distinguish-
able, processes – theophylogeny (the original fabrication and 
development of a particular concept of God) and theontogeny 
(the ongoing reproduction of an extant concept of God in the 
minds of new group members). Figure 3 updates Figure 2 into an 
illustration of the induction- perception-confabulation process in 
the specifically religious domain, and depicts both theophylogeny 
and theontogeny.
theophylogeny
The actual inception of a god, as an historical event that takes 
place on a local scale and whose significance can usually be 
identified only in retrospect, is the more speculative of the two 
processes. However, an episode in the story of Islam – in fact, 
its foundational miracle – offers a possible illustration of the 
process: one day while meditating, Muhammed found himself 
compelled by a mysterious figure to “Recite!.” Opening his 
mouth, he discovered, much to his surprise, that despite his illit-
eracy, he could extemporize beautiful poetry (Armstong, 1992). 
In consultation with his wife, Khadija, and a cousin passingly 
familiar with Judaism and Christianity, he identified the figure 
who so compelled him as the archangel Gabriel, thus initiating 
the process of weaving his own experience together with ele-
ments of Arabic, Jewish, and Christian culture to fabricate an 
effectively new deity of Al-Lah. Note the extent to which his 
story conforms to the model presented here – the suppression of 
consciousness (via meditation) is followed by a display of previ-
ously unsuspected and surprising talents, initiating a collective 
search for explanation in which available cultural constructs are 
employed to confabulate a new god.
More generally, the present theory assumes that, given their 
biological and cultural similarities, members of intact social 
groups are likely to experience similar non-consciously induced 
states, knowledge, and behaviors under similar circumstances. 
When the most saliently anomalous of these prompt members 
to turn to one another in search of explanation, the intersub-
jectivity of their experience reifies it, and thus instigates the 
collective project of embroidering their individual impressions 
of the universal moral non-conscious with the particular details 
and mythologies made available by their specific culture in order 
to confabulate their unique god.
In that such confabulation is a collective enterprise, it con-
stitutes an – and arguably, the primordial – instance of social 
construction. What the present theory brings to this well-worked 
soil is an evolutionary and psychological base that amplifies its 
explanatory power. For example, by specifying the ubiquitous 
motivating need and instigating events that drive this particular 
variety of construction, as well as the uniformly human traits 
(dualism, propensity for induction, moral faculties, and confabu-
latory inclinations) that are its antecedents, the present theory can 
FiGUre 3 | theogenesis.
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explain why the confabulation of entities recognizable as gods is 
such a universal practice of human societies.
The model also helps account for some systematic variability 
in the nature of the entities constructed. For example, religious 
traditions often postulate immoral counterparts to their gods, i.e., 
demons (Lucifer, The Trickster in Native American lore, Shaitan 
in Islam, Mara in Buddhism, etc.). While the existence of such 
diabolical supernatural entities might seem at odds with a theory 
that locates the origin of the gods in the moral non-conscious, it 
actually underscores an important distinction between the moral 
non-conscious and the non-conscious as a whole. Although 
the non-conscious includes the moral faculties, that is not all it 
encompasses. Along with a host of morally neutral cognitive and 
social capacities (e.g., subitizing, facial recognition), it contains 
elements whose homeostatic and/or reproductive imperatives 
render them effectively “selfish” or “immoral.”
Just as the non-conscious moral faculties sometimes lead 
us to do “right” when we do not consciously intend or expect 
to, these darker aspects of the non-conscious sometimes 
induce us to do (or feel) the “wrong” thing. No less so than 
moral feelings and behaviors, such non-conscious-mediated 
experiences incite the confabulation of an entity with which 
to explain them. At such times, it is useful and subjectively 
accurate to declare, with Flip Wilson’s infamous “Geraldine” 
character, that “The Devil made me do it!”. Like the gods, 
once created, such demons serve as a handy anomaly sink by 
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which other surprising behaviors and abilities emerging from 
the non-conscious can be explained, as nearly happened in the 
case of Muhammed when he at first feared that his newfound 
affinity for impromptu poetry was the work of a Jinni, or as did 
happen in the case of Robert Johnson, whose newfound musical 
talent was ascribed to a bargain he made with the devil. The 
fact that immoral deities are typically perceived as diabolically 
seductive and deceptive rather than righteously compulsive is 
supportive of their here-hypothesized origins in the non-moral 
non-conscious, since, though partaking of the non-conscious’s 
characteristic ineffability, externality, and superiority, they lack 
the coerciveness and moral imprimatur of gods emerging from 
the moral non-conscious and must therefore rely on other, more 
devious, means of influence.
theontogeny
Though the exact dividing line is elusive, at some point, the 
outlines of the newly confabulated gods are well-enough estab-
lished for theophylogeny to transform into theontogeny [or, as 
per Berger and Luckmann (1967), for objectivation to give way 
to internalization] as the gods are perpetually re-created in the 
minds of other and future group members. Theontogeny follows 
much the same process as theophylogeny, except that, because the 
need to explain anomalous states and behaviors now arises within 
a cultural context that provides a conceptual apparatus that is 
both socially pre-legitimated and closely tailored to the typical 
member’s explanatory needs, accounting for these experiences 
becomes less a matter of confabulating a new entity than the 
simpler one of misattributing them to a pre-existing construct.
Indeed, the process of theontogeny often proceeds in reverse 
order from that of theophylogeny, in that, at the individual 
level, possession of the relevant constructs (as socialized in 
childhood) may precede their recruitment for nomos preser-
vation by years or even decades. It is only once the individual 
experiences their own moral-non-consciously fueled anomalies 
and realizes the constructs’ applicability to those experiences 
(or has it pointed out to them) that the episode is recognized as 
an encounter with “God.” At that point, their formerly abstract 
religious knowledge becomes concrete religious belief. They are, 
in short, “born again.”
Once it has thus been acquired and achieved subjective cred-
ibility, “God” readily proves its value as a tool for preserving the 
nomos by accounting for a spectrum of otherwise anomalous 
experiences emerging from the non-conscious.11 Over time, 
it canalizes the explanations for an ever-expanding range of 
phenomena back into itself to create a comprehensive and 
11 Though we are primarily concerned here with religious confabulation as a 
response to anomalies engendered by conscious/non-conscious duplexity, the 
efficacy of gods as a means of resolving experience/expectation discrepancies is 
underscored by their deployment to account for those arising from other forms of 
mental multiplexity. Consider, for example, the frequency with which victims of 
schizophrenia (literally “split mind”) incorporate religious deities into their delu-
sions, arguably as a means of accommodating their nomi to the hallucinations and 
compulsions characteristic of their disorder (Gearing et al., 2011).
self-reinforcing system. Thus, the foresights, insights, and creative 
syntheses produced by the non-conscious mode are interpreted 
as “revelations from God” or “epiphanies” (literally “encounters 
with God”), as when Handel exclaimed, “I think God has visited 
me!” upon completing his Messiah (Gangemi, 2009). Likewise, 
the resolve and emotional reserves that reside in the non-con-
scious are taken as “strength from God,” as when a woman who, 
along with her children, recently landed a world-record alligator 
proclaimed: “We give all the glory to God. Ten men couldn’t 
have done what we did …” [in Dute (2014)]. Such utility extends 
as well to accounting for the behavior of others, as when John 
Wesley wrote abolitionist leader William Wilberforce to say that: 
“Unless the divine power raised you up to be as Athanasius contra 
mundum, I cannot see how you can go through your glorious 
enterprise” [in Telford (1931), p. 265].
More generally, a whole gamut of behaviors arising from 
the compulsive power of the moral non-conscious comes to 
be understood as manifestations of “God’s power to move 
me,” and the compelling beneficence that our non-conscious 
morality evokes in us is recast as “the love of God.” Indeed, as 
per Feuerbach (1989) [1841], the “essence” of religion lies in its 
penchant for alienating natural human moral dispositions toward 
goodness, mercy, justice, and love from their true provenance in 
the individual person and misattributing them to one or another 
deity’s power to make us behave morally, despite our putatively 
depraved natures.
An in vivo illustration of theontogeny comes courtesy of my 
local newspaper. The story concerns a woman who stopped at 
a convenience store while passing through a small Alabama 
town en route to her home in Atlanta. There, she encountered a 
young girl accompanied by an older man. Feeling that something 
about their interaction was awry, the woman contacted the local 
police, who, because she could not identify a concrete cause for 
alarm, dismissed her concerns. The woman continued home, 
but unable to shake her anxiety, soon returned to make further 
inquiries. Thus goaded into action, the police investigated and 
determined that the young girl was in fact a victim of severe 
sexual abuse by her companion, who is currently in prison for 
the crime (Baggett, 2007).
This woman’s actions are unquestionably heroic. They are also 
easy to explain in terms of our model: among the non-conscious 
mode’s most developed faculties are those for person perception 
and emotion detection. Thus, the pair’s stilted demeanor was 
accurately interpreted by her non-conscious mode, but as the 
actual triggers were inaccessible to her conscious mode, she was 
unable to articulate her discomfort other than to say that some-
thing “felt wrong.” Driven by her empathetic faculties to aid and 
protect the child, she did the right thing, but without conscious 
reasons to do so.
Her own account of events demonstrates the explanatory value 
of her culture’s construct of god: “I didn’t do anything really, it 
was God, I tried to make the feeling go away, but God said not 
to. It was like I could hear a voice saying ‘Tracie, go back there 
and find that child’ …  I don’t deserve any credit. God had the 
power to save those children” (Baggett, 2007, p. A1). When, as a 
result of the workings of her non-conscious mode, this woman 
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experienced an apparently external, ineffable, superior, coercive, 
and moral force, she naturally called it by the name that her 
culture provides for such entities: “God.”
ConCLUsion
This paper has sketched a new theory of theogenesis in which 
“God” is a spandrel created by the interaction of humans’ dual 
systems of behavioral control with their profoundly social and 
moral nature. Though it builds upon and reiterates Durkheim’s 
seminal insights about religion, the present model is intended 
neither to “fulfill” or instantiate Durkheim, as it diverges from 
his precedent in several ways. Most obviously, its explicit evoca-
tion of evolutionary, biological, and psychological concepts and 
mechanisms is antithetical to the sociological “purity” that he is 
commonly (and mostly mistakenly) believed to have advocated. 
But by explicating these underpinnings, the present model 
significantly advances the fundamental theoretical desiderata of 
empirical plausibility and explanatory scope of the present theory 
well beyond its Durkhiemian antecedents.
As to the first, a theory can be no more credible than are its 
component assumptions and mechanisms. Although the present 
model assembles them into an original whole, all of its constituent 
parts are, as demonstrated herein, well-corroborated. Thus, we 
can be confident that Homo is indeed Duplex that human beings 
do possess innate moral faculties, that the non-conscious induc-
tion of states and behaviors does occur, and that human beings do 
confabulate in the service of nomos maintenance.
Moreover, much of the literature cited here in the service of 
such “modular substantiation” closely parallels these compo-
nents’ herein-hypothesized combinations and instantiations, 
such that they simultaneously constitute a kind of “analogous 
substantiation.” For example, the cited research demonstrates 
not only the reality of both induction and confabulation, but also 
that the former often precipitates the latter as required by the 
model. Absent any a priori reason why the same combinations of 
processes should not obtain in the specifically religious domain, 
such evidence further vindicates the theory.
Of course, modular and analogous forms of substantiation 
do not obviate the need for more holistic corroboration that the 
postulated relationships and processes actually do obtain in the 
real world, and for that reason, the present paper also aggregates 
such evidence in the form of multiple correlations between the 
subjective experience of god and that of its hypothesized true 
referent. Though hardly definitive in and of themselves, taken 
together, these complementary forms of empirical substantiation 
lend the model an initial plausibility unusual among macro-level 
sociological theories.
The same attention to fundamental mechanisms that enhances 
empirical plausibility also expands the model’s explanatory scope 
and power. Breaking the process of theogenesis down into its 
constituent mechanisms connects the present model to these 
mechanisms, and thereby to the extensive bodies of research and 
theory associated with each. Given that these literatures include 
such foundational and highly developed topics as cognitive 
dissonance, social influence, reciprocity, moral judgment, and, 
yes, evolution itself, the resulting network of potential applica-
tions and extensions is remarkably fertile. Some of the model’s 
power to illuminate diverse aspects of religion has been touched 
on herein – e.g., the symbiosis of religion and art, the origin of 
demons, and the ubiquity of religious sacrifice – but these merely 
scratch the surface.
A genuinely fecund theory suggests new variables and 
mechanisms that help make sense of yet more distal phenom-
ena, which the present model does. For instance, a logical 
corollary of gods that are confabulated to fill the gap between 
one’s expected and actual behaviors is that as culturally derived 
assumptions of human behavior vary, so should the size of this 
gap, and with that, the probability and extent of theogenetic 
confabulation. Put simply, the less morality one expects from 
themselves and others, the more one needs to confabulate a 
moral god to resolve this discrepancy. Consider the United 
States: as Tocqueville observed long ago, and others have 
more recently confirmed, Americans are singularly likely to 
espouse rationalist, self-interested accounts of their own, and 
others, behavior (Tocqueville, 1994 [1835], Wuthnow, 1991). 
The present model would suggest that this cultural proclivity 
could contribute to the United States’ relatively high degree of 
religiosity among developed nations (Paul, 2005), as it would 
require the confabulation of a larger entity to bridge the larger 
gap it creates between the expectation and experience of moral 
behavior among Americans.
Ultimately, any theory’s importance is a function of its ability 
to change our understanding of the world by leading us to new, 
counterintuitive, conclusions. In the best sociological tradition, 
the present model inverts the conventional view of religion as 
a moralizing force imposed upon a fundamentally immoral (or 
at best amoral) human nature by arguing that it is not the gods 
who make humankind moral,12 but human morality that makes 
the gods.
Given its demonstrated empirical plausibility, wide explana-
tory scope, and the fact that much the same mechanisms have 
previously demonstrated their ability to illuminate such fun-
damental religious phenomena as ritual (Marshall, 2002) and 
the sacred (Marshall, 2010), it appears possible that the present 
model represents the kernel of a new and comprehensive theory 
of religion.
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